JUDGING UNTRIED CASES
DANIEL RICHMAN
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In response to Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005).
That federal criminal trials are an endangered species is clear.
During fiscal year 2004, only 4% (3346) of the 83,391 federal defen1
dants in terminated cases went to trial. And, trends that Professor
2
Ronald Wright highlights in his insightful article have continued past
the end point of his data. In 1994, 4639 defendants obtained verdicts
from juries and 1050 from judges; in 2003, just 2909 and 615, respec3
tively, did so. Every time one thinks that the system has hit an equilibrium at some “natural” distribution, the trial rate goes down a bit
more.
Should we be worried about this? As an institutional matter, the
answer is a firm “probably.” Trials do many things, only one of which
is to give a criminal defendant the means to put the government to its
4
proof before an impartial jury of his peers. After all, jurors do double
service; they serve not only as triers of fact but also as dragooned witnesses to a criminal justice process that—but for a handful of wellpublicized “celebrity” cases and the many fake cases on television—
gets all too little attention. Trials also give us a (small) chance to address, or at least assess, the extraordinary agency problem that bedevils a low-visibility system in which advocates for both sides—defense
lawyers and prosecutors—can hide their sloth or inadequacy through
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plea bargains. To be sure, the constitutional standards for ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial are all too low. But at least the presence
of a judge and a defendant, a lawyer’s own self-respect, and the creation of a record that goes far beyond a guilty-plea allocution, provide a
starting point for monitoring and review. Trials also raise the likelihood that prosecutors will adequately monitor and review the work of
the investigative agents or police officers on whose work they must
5
rely. In addition, trials (may) enlighten the negotiating that occurs
6
in its shadow. Finally, trials give some (perhaps dim) promise that
the priorities and concerns of the community will be internalized by
7
courtroom actors.
Then there are the needs of the trial participants—which need to
be attended to, if for only instrumental reasons. Being “on trial” can
be an ordeal, but it’s what most of the lawyers in the system (including
the judges) live for. It’s their chance to strut their stuff (trial advocacy
skills or judicial temperament, knowledge of the hearsay rule, etc.)
and, particularly in the federal system, to develop valuable human
capital that is extremely hard to acquire outside the criminal process
8
(federal civil trials are even rarer than federal criminal trials). Big
law firms rarely actually go to trial—they just engage in “litigation”—
but they need to present a credible threat of trial and are ready to pay
handsomely for that capability. Without casting any aspersions on the
5
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commitment to public service or the zealous advocacy of young prosecutors or defenders, one presumes that this aftermarket has a dramatic influence on the quality of applicants and the relatively low sala9
ries required to attract them.
I am not prepared to make the claim that any marginal additional
funding of the criminal justice system would best be spent on trials or
even on the adjudicative process generally. After all, police departments, law enforcement agencies, and prosecutors’ offices might better spend the money on training and internal monitoring. Although
someone who used the Constitution as her only guide to criminal
procedure might think otherwise, we have opted for (or slid into)
what Jerry Lynch has provocatively characterized as a “prosecutorial10
administrative system” for handling almost all of our cases. And any
honest budgeting process should reflect that. On the other hand, in
the absence of output measures other than sheer numbers of arrests,
prosecutions, and convictions, the risk that enforcers would use the
extra funding simply to bring more cases—not better ones—is considerable. Such a concern highlights the need to explore the plea data.
To what extent can one go beyond “fears” and “concerns,” and
determine that the inexorable reduction in trials actually reflects an
impairment of the federal criminal system’s truth-finding function?
Put differently: should we be worrying about the dispositions that are
occurring in the absence of trials? Professor Wright sets out to answer
these questions by considering the relationship between the trial ac11
quittal rate and the guilty plea rate. He also endeavors to ascertain
whether the drop in the acquittal rate, even as the plea rate climbs, is
a sign that prosecutors and agencies are bringing stronger cases (the
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“accuracy hypothesis”), or an indication that prosecutors have been so
12
empowered by the federal sentencing regime that they have been
able to pressure defendants, who would otherwise have been acquitted
had they not been coerced into giving up their right to trial, into
13
pleading guilty (“the trial distortion theory”)? After carefully considering the data and taking pains to make appropriate qualifications,
Professor Wright reports that “dropping acquittal rates over the last
decade in federal court is a valid cause of concern,” and concludes,
“The acquittal trend reveals a system that probably distorts trial out14
comes and produces less reliable results than it once did.”
In assessing the power of Professor Wright’s analysis, we confront
the fundamental challenge to all quantitative analyses of the federal
system. The allure of that system is obvious. It’s not just that the
“feds” have always attracted lay and scholarly attention far out of proportion to their relative numbers. It’s that the same fiscal flexibility
15
(or maybe unaccountability) that allows it to save up to make the big
cases also permits it to fund unparalleled data-collection efforts. (The
fact that only the federal system prints money, and needn’t balance its
budget, helps too.) But it has one enormous drawback: in many aspects, it’s not a “system” at all, but rather an adjunct to state or, more
often, local criminal justice systems. Indeed, while the involvement of
a federal judge and correctional facility is generally a nonnegotiable
feature of a federal prosecution, the rest is up for grabs. “Federal”
12

Professor Wright quite rightly notes, “Recent developments in federal sentencing law accelerated the trend toward concentrating the control over the trial penalty in
the hands of the prosecutor.” Id. at 133. It is possible that the combined effect of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007), and its forthcoming decisions in United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127
S. Ct. 2933 (2007) (No. 06-7949), and United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App’x 798 (4th
Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007) (No. 06-6330), will start to reverse this
trend by delineating the freedom of sentencing judges to reject the policy choices in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. But it is far too soon to tell. And the limited effect
of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005), holding that the sentencing ranges
set by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and not mandatory, counsels
skepticism on this point. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY
DATA REPORT 1 tbl.1 (2007) available at http://www.ussc.gov/sc_cases/
Quarter_Report_3rd_07.pdf (reporting that, of sentences imposed from October 1,
2006, through June 30, 2007, 61.2% of sentences were “within guideline range” and
25.2% of sentences were “government sponsored below range”).
13
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on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 613-15 (2005)
(contending that well-developed performance measures for federal authorities are
scarce).
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cases regularly arise out of arrests by local police working within “joint
task forces” or on their own, with or without prearrangement with
federal prosecutors.
The fact that the “federal” trademark has been thus extended
(some would say diluted) poses severe challenges to the study of the
federal system. Consider Professor Wright’s suggestion that when a
prosecutor’s office uses new resources to buy extra quantity, “newly
added cases are likely to involve less serious crimes or less persuasive
evidence, because the office would have already selected the highest
16
priority cases with the first available funds.” This is quite a reasonable suggestion, in the abstract, but it is highly contestable when dealing with prosecutors able to tap into an effectively inexhaustible system of strong cases involving quite serious street-level gun and drug
offenses that can “go federal” if the necessary arrangements are
17
made. One might argue, as a matter of policy, that these marginally
18
federal cases could be more appropriately handled at the local level.
But the fact remains that a U.S. Attorney can easily substitute several
gun cases, presented on a silver platter by local police officers interested in the higher sentences and quicker processing offered by the
19
federal system, for one complex fraud case that, because it requires a
20
long grand jury investigation, will require an extensive prosecutorial
resource commitment.
16
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Because prosecutorial resource commitments are so tied to case
mix, aggregate caseload statistics are also hard to interpret. Professor
Wright observes that “since caseloads stayed flat during the most recent drop in acquittal rates [during the 1990s], it is hard to believe
that extra prosecutor efforts in each case produced more accurate
21
outcomes during this period.” However, “[f]rom 1989 to 1998, the
number of firearms cases filed in the U.S. district courts increased 61
22
percent from 2,256 to 3,641.” By the late 1990s, firearms defendants
constituted about 4.5% of all federal cases (after having comprised
23
less than 2% in the 1980s). The nature of the announced firearm
24
programs during this period gives good reason to assume that a large
proportion of these firearms cases were the product of federal adoption of local arrests. We can be less sure of the narcotics cases (which
represent a much larger chunk of the federal docket), since that category encompasses the products both of intensive federal drug investigations (which might involve considerable prosecutorial commitment) and of collaborations with local authorities that shunted
prescreened, lower-level cases into the federal system for adjudication.
But the programmatic commitment to street criminals—of the violent
and low-level drug-dealing variety—has produced a steady stream of
federal cases, and of defendants with prior convictions (since street
criminals are more likely to have prior state convictions) that needs to
be factored into the data.
It is therefore quite possible that the vanishing acquittal rate reflects an increase in the adoption of well-established “local” cases (that
even when not “easy,” involve the commitment of nonfederal resources) even as prosecutorial efforts have been spent on making
stronger cases in the white collar area. I have no idea whether this is
true nationally (although it’s my impression that it is true in certain
districts). But I need to know more about this possibility before I fully
accept Professor Wright’s point. I would also like to know more about
21
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the role of immigration cases in the identified trend, and about the
mix of immigration cases, since that category will include both slamdunk cases of illegal entry and far more difficult smuggling cases.
Although I thus hesitate to join Professor Wright in worrying
about the “problem” he identifies, I applaud his commitment to
thinking hard about the trials that might have been. Having driven
the factfinding process into law enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices, we should not be satisfied with either vague speculation
about coerced innocents or smug confidence in “voluntary” waivers
and administrative processes. We need to know much more, and the
quantitative rigor that Professor Wright brings to the federal plea
process is certainly a big (and appropriately careful) step in the right
direction.
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